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Aristotle on Atomism
Alan Chalmers
Two knds of atomsm emerged n the phlosophy off the Presocratcs. One knd was 
devsed as a response to Parmendes and nvolved ndvsble physcal atoms. The other 
knd emerged n response to zeno’s paradoxes and nvolved ndvsble magntudes 
that served as a barrer to the nfinte dvson that led to those paradoxes. I argue, con-
trary to a range of postons to be found n the lterature that Arstotle was aware of the 
dstncton between the two knds of atomsm, dd not attrbute an atomsm nvolvng 
ndvsble magntudes to Democrtus, and countered the two knds of atomsm wth 
dstnct knds of arguments.
1. Introduction
There are two knds of atomsm that emerged n Ancent Greece. One knd, nvolvng 
physcal atoms, arose n response to the denal of change by Parmendes. The other 
knd, nvolvng ndvsble magntudes, arose n response to zeno’s paradoxes. Our 
man source of nformaton on the atomsm formulated by Leucppus and Democ-
rtus, to whch I wll refer smply as “Democrtean atomsm”, s Arstotle. There are 
conflctng vews n the lterature concernng the nature of the atomsm that Arstotle 
attrbuted to Leucppus and Democrtus and, consequently, on what Arstotle’s cr-
tque of atomsm nvolved. Davd Furley (1967:79–101) s of the vew that Arstotle 
attrbutes to Democrtus two dstnct brands of atomsm, as Epcurus unambguously 
came to do n the century after Arstotle. G. S. Krk, J. E. Raven and M. Schofield 
(1999:415) clam that Furley has read more nto the text than s justfied. Jonathan 
Barnes (1996:352– 60) argues that Arstotle’s commentares are consstent wth Dem-
ocrtus defendng only physcal atomsm. Rchard Sorabj (1983:354–7) explans the 
fact that Furley and Barnes can both find grounds for ther vews n Arstotle on the 
assumpton that Arstotle dd not n fact clearly dstngush between the two knds of 
atomsm wth the consequence that there are ambgutes n hs characterzaton and 
crtque of Democrtus.
I attempt to clarfy the stuaton n ths artcle. I take ssue wth the way the ds-
tncton between the two knds of ndvsblty, possessed by physcal atoms and 
ndvsble magntudes respectvely, has been characterzed n the lterature and try to 
do better. I argue that Arstotle dd apprecate the dstncton between the two knds 
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of atomsm and the correspondng two notons of dvsblty. I also suggest that the 
grounds for assumng that Arstotle represents Democrtus as havng nvoked nd-
vsble magntudes are weak. Arstotle had consderable admraton for Democrtus’s 
theory. Hs reasons for rejectng t were qute dfferent from hs reasons for rejectng 
ndvsble magntudes and ther deployment n combatng zeno’s paradoxes.
2. Physical Atomism as a Response to Parmenides
Parmendes famously dened the possblty of any knd of change. On hs account, 
the world s a homogeneous, motonless, unchangng sphercal extent of “beng”. Ths 
s so because the exstence of non-beng s regarded as an absurdty, so there s noth-
ng to dvde one porton of beng from another.1 Leucppus and Democrtus avoded 
the Parmendean concluson by allowng for the exstence of non-beng n the form 
of the vod. The vod exsts where beng s absent. Small peces of beng, called atoms, 
are mnature Parmendean worlds nsofar as they are homogeneous, contan no non-
beng and are unchangeable. However, they dffer from the Parmendean world nsofar 
as they have a varety of shapes and szes and are capable of moton through the vod. 
Atoms move n the vod and sometmes collde wth other atoms. Because of ther ntr-
cate shapes, colldng atoms sometmes combne together by becomng nterlocked, 
wth hooks engagng wth eyes or some such thng. It s n ths way that the macro-
scopc materals of our experence, and ndeed the world tself, comes to be formed. 
Contnuty through change s explaned by the persstence of unchangng atoms, whlst 
change comes about as the result of the motons and rearrangements of atoms.
The atoms nvolved n ths response to Parmendes are physcal atoms. They are 
slabs of beng wth a definte shape and sze that can move, collde and become nter-
locked wth other slabs of beng. These atoms are unchangeable n the sense that they 
cannot be dvded or dstorted n any way. They are physcal atoms that cannot be 
physcally dvded.
3. Atomism as a Response to Zeno
zeno proposed four paradoxes desgned to challenge the dea that moton s poss-
ble. Before I can reach the door of the room I have to get half way to the door. Once I 
have done so I have to bsect the remanng dstance and so on for an nfinte number 
of bsectons. I cannot reach the door because t s mpossble to execute an nfinte 
number of tasks. I fact, my moton to the door cannot even get started because how-
ever small the first part of my moton mght be, traversng t wll nvolve an nfinte 
number of bsecton. There are three related paradoxes, nvolvng Achlles’ falure to 
catch the tortose n a race n whch he has gven the tortose a start; a movng arrow, 
whch, n occupyng an extenson of space equal to ts length at any nstant, does not 
dffer from a statonary arrow; and two rows of carrages movng n opposte drec-
tons past a statonary row, desgned to show that the movng carrages are movng at 
1 For a detaled reconstructon of Parmendes’ argument see Barnes (1996:155–230).
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two speeds at the same tme dependng on whether the speed s determned relatve 
to the statonary or other movng carrages. (Ths latter paradox s rather easly solved 
by nvokng a noton of relatve velocty avalable to the Ancents, unless space tself s 
assumed to be made up of ndvsble magntudes.) A fifth paradox s what I wll refer 
to as the paradox of dvson. Suppose an object s nfintely dvsble and suppose t 
has been nfintely dvded. Do the nfinte number of parts resultng have a finte sze 
or don’t they? If they have zero sze then they wll yeld zero sze when recombned. 
If they have finte sze then the nfinte number of parts wll yeld nfinte sze when 
recombned. In nether case can the orgnal finte szed whole be recovered.
The paradoxes all nvolve some knd of nfinte dvson and the path to them can 
be blocked by denyng that nfintely dvsble contnua exst. Ths leads to our second 
knd of atomsm. It postulates the exstence of ndvsble magntudes that set lmts 
to the dvson of any magntude, whether a physcal magntude or a magntude of 
space or tme.  
4. Physical Atoms do not Solve Zeno’s Paradoxes
Atomsm postulatng physcal atoms s dstnct from atomsm that postulates ndvs-
ble magntudes. The former type of atomsm does not provde a general resoluton of 
zeno’s paradoxes. To see ths, magne I am tryng to reach the door by successvely 
bsectng the dstance remanng to travel and suppose that I have nearly made t. 
Suppose I have just one physcal atom to go. Then my task has hardly begun. Because 
before I can pass the physcal atom I have to pass half of t, before I can pass half of t 
I have to pass a quarter of t and so on. 
The clam that physcal atoms do not help solve zeno’s paradoxes needs a slght 
qualficaton. The paradox of dvson was sometmes nterpreted as expressng a 
worry about the possblty of nfintely dvsble matter wearng away to nothng.2 
Physcally ndvsble atoms do resolve that worry.
5. Types of Divisibility
Physcal atoms do not serve to resolve zeno’s paradoxes because, as my comments n 
the prevous secton presupposed, they are dvsble. They are dvsble n some sense 
other than physcally dvsble. There s a need for clarty concernng what ths non-
physcal knd of dvsblty s. I do not find the lterature adequate n ths respect. 
There, the tendency s to dstngush physcal parts of atoms from conceptual or theo-
retcal parts, and to talk of mental dvson as opposed to physcal dvson. Furley 
(1967:4) dstngushes between physcal dvson and “theoretcal dvson”, where an 
object s theoretcally dvsble “f parts can be dstngushed wthn t by the mnd”. 
Sorabj (1983:352) makes the dstncton n terms of two knds of barrer to dv-
son, physcal barrers and conceptual barrers. Andrew Pyle (1995:20) dstngushes 
2 Arstotle seems to construe the paradox n that way n Generation and Corruption, 1, 2, 316b:23–28.
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between physcal dvson and dvson “n thought” and Barnes (1996:353) dstn-
gushes between “dvson by the axe” and “dvson by the mnd”.
I suggest t s nadequate to pose conceptual parts and mental dvson as the alter-
natve to physcal parts and physcal dvson. Physcal atoms do not have physcal 
parts n the sense that no part of an atom can be detached from the remander. Nev-
ertheless, physcal atoms have parts n a sense that does not depend on dvson by the 
mnd. Some physcal atoms have protuberances lke hooks, dstnct from the man 
body of the atom, that may slot nto somethng lke eyes that are the parts of other 
atoms. A large physcal atom mght sheld a small physcal atom from a shower of 
small physcal atoms but a small one cannot sheld a large one because parts of the 
larger one wll protrude. When one atom moves past another t passes the nearer 
parts before t passes the further ones. Physcal atoms have parts. It s napproprate 
to call these parts conceptual parts for the reasons I have gven. “Geometrcal parts” 
would do ncely f t were not for the fact that contnuous magntudes other than geo-
metrcal extensons have parts too, such as tme. I propose the term “metrcal parts” 
and wll talk of metrcal dvson nto metrcal parts.
When one physcal atom passes another t must pass t part by part. If the atom 
beng passed s contnuous t wll have an nfinte number of metrcal parts whch 
wll need to be passed. To the extent that the accomplshment of an nfinte number 
of passngs poses a problem, zeno’s paradoxes threaten n a way that s not lnked to 
dvson by the mnd.
As we have seen, one way to block the path to zeno’s paradoxes s to postulate nd-
vsble magntudes, or, n my termnology, ndvsble metrcal parts. Such “atoms” 
are qute dstnct from physcal atoms.3 The latter have shape and sze as well as beng 
physcally ndvsble and they need to have such features n order to be able to play 
the physcal role they are meant to play. Metrcally ndvsble parts presumably all 
have the same sze, the lmt of metrcal dvson. It s not clear whether metrcally 
ndvsble parts can have a shape and, f they can, what shape.
6. Did Aristotle Distinguish Between Physical and 
Metrical Division and Physical and Metrical Parts?
The dstncton between physcal dvson and what I have called metrcal dvson 
s not a partcularly subtle one and gven the subtlety of many of the dstnctons 
that Arstotle was able to make and apprecate, I find t hard to beleve that Arstotle 
was unaware of t. In any case, n one locaton Arstotle makes the dstncton qute 
explct (although not usng my termnology of course). He does so n On the Heavens 
(306a:30–306b:2) n a context where he s dscussng Plato’s vew that the propertes 
of the four elements are to be attrbuted to the shapes of ther atoms. The passage 
reads as follows:
3 Arstotle used the word “atom” (άτοµο) to refer to ndvsble magntudes and sometmes, but less 
frequently, to refer to physcal atoms.
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For any one who wshes to gve each element a shape of ts own, and makes ths the 
ground of the dstncton between the substances, has to attrbute to them ndvsblty; 
snce dvson of a pyramd or a sphere must leave somewhere at least a resdue that s not 
a sphere or a pyramd. Ether, then, a part of fire s not fire, so that there s a body pror 
to the element — for every body s ether an element or composed of elements — or not 
every body s dvsble.
Whether or not Arstotle has adequately characterzed Plato’s theory and effectvely 
crtczed t need not concern us. What s mportant s that Arstotle ponts out that 
to fulfill the role they need to play n Plato’s theory, the trangles and other shapes 
that consttute hs atoms must be ndvsble. The reason he gves s that dvson of 
them leads to parts of some other shape. He explctly assumes here that the atoms are 
ndvsble n one sense (analogous f not dentcal to the sense n whch Democrtean 
atoms are physcally ndvsble) and dvsble n another sense whch corresponds to 
what I have termed metrcal dvsblty.
Arstotle was defintely aware of, and used, a dstncton between physcal and 
metrcal dvsblty. However, the fact that he made the dstncton clear n one place 
does not mply that he dd not confuse the ssue elsewhere. So I have more work to do 
to free Arstotle of the charge of not adequately employng the dstncton.
7. Aristotle’s Response to Zeno
One area n whch Arstotle mght be accused of not adherng to the dstncton s n 
hs dscusson and response to zeno’s paradoxes. I agree that Arstotle does not make 
clear the method of dvson n hs dscusson. But ths s not a falng because hs 
argument, properly understood, does not depend on a specification of the method of 
division. Ths needs explanng.
Arstotle apprecated the problems that zeno posed for the noton of a contnuum 
understood as “that whch s dvsble nto dvsbles that are nfintely dvsble” 
(Physics, 6, 2, 232b:25).4 He argued that t s not possble to construct a contnuous 
magntude out of ndvsbles on the grounds that to do so requres that the ndvs-
bles be lad part to part or edge to edge, an mpossblty gven that ndvsbles lack 
parts or edges (6, 1, 231a:21 –= 231b:5). Nor can ndvsble ponts be lad n suc-
cesson snce, from the definton of a contnuum, two ndvsble ponts not conc-
dent wll have an nfinty of ndvsble ponts n between them (6, 1, 231b:6–14). He 
argued that movng ndvsbles ental ndvsble unts of tme, snce f one ndvsble 
passes another n tme, t, and tme s contnuous, then t wll pass half that ndvsble 
n half the tme, thus dvdng the ndvsble. Gven the consequence that ndvs-
bles of tme follow from ndvsble spatal magntudes, Arstotle concluded that ths 
knd of atomsm entals that moton must occur n jerks, whch he clearly regarded as 
absurd (6, 1, 231b:19–232a–12). He argued that the present, separatng the past and 
future, cannot have any duraton, so that tme s not made up of “nows” and he used 
4 All translatons of Arstotle are from McKeon (1968).
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ths to combat zeno’s arrow paradox (6, 3, 233b:33–234b:9). He also sought to resolve 
zeno’s other paradoxes of moton. He argued that, although a dstance to be traversed 
can be dvded nto an nfinty of parts by successve bsectons the avalable tme can 
also be so dvded, wth each dstance to be traversed matched by an nterval of tme, 
the nfinte number of dstances and tmes both havng a finte sum (Physics, 6, 2, 
233a:22–32 and 6, 9, 239b:10–29). 
There remans the puzzle of how the passng of an nfinte number of spaces or 
tmes can be accomplshed, whether to reach the door or to catch the tortose. Arstotle 
responded to ths wth a dstncton between actual and potental dvson. Dstances 
and duratons, and any other contnuous magntudes, are sad by Arstotle to be dvs-
ble potentally but not actually (Physics, 8, 8, 263a:15–263b:9). The dstance separat-
ng me from the door s potentally dvsble. The halfway pont potentally dvdes t 
n half. The dvson can be actualsed, by severng or markng the floor, by my passng 
half-way and then stoppng, or by my merely makng the dvson n thought. But, 
havng so halved the dstance, the remanng dstance remans potentally dvsble, 
and so on, however many halvngs are actualsed. The (potental) nfinte dvsblty 
of contnuous magntudes s not, for Arstotle, relatve to some process of dvson. 
Further actual dvson of contnuous magntudes s always possble whatever the 
process of dvson because contnuous magntudes are nfintely dvsble.5 
Arstotle responds to zeno’s paradoxes of moton by nsstng that contnuous 
magntudes such as lnes, although potentally dvsble at an nfinty of ponts, are not 
made up of ponts and cannot be actually dvded at an nfinty of ponts. He further 
assumes that a lne s not dvded by contnuous moton along t, snce the moton, 
lke the space and tme t nvolves, s nfintely dvsble. Segments of moton, however 
small, can be pared off wth the tmes taken for that moton and the dstances cov-
ered by t. Dvson at a pont wll requre markng off the pont n some way, whether 
by stoppng at, or markng or contemplatng t. An nfinty of such actual dvsons 
of a contnuum s mpossble, not because of lmtatons n our physcal or mental 
resources, but, more fundamentally, because the contnuum s nfintely dvsble, wth 
ponts not standng next to pont, nor ndvsble next to ndvsble. In Generation and 
Corruption (I, 2, 317a:1–13) Arstotle apples ths knd of reasonng to dssolve zeno’s 
paradox of dvson. A contnuous entty, as such, s dvsble at any pont, but t cannot 
be smultaneously dvded everywhere, because a contnuous magntude s not made 
up of ponts n the requred sense. Hence, the nfinte dvson presupposed n the 
paradox s mpossble.6 Once agan, the pont rests on an analyss of the nature of the 
contnuum and does not requre a specficaton of the method of dvson. 
Arstotle had responses to zeno’s paradoxes that retaned the noton of contnuous 
magntudes, tmes and motons that avoded appealng to ndvsble magntudes. The 
fact that he dd not specfy the method of dvson should not be taken as evdence 
5 My nterpretaton of Arstotle’s poston s n lne wth that of Lear (1979–80). 
6 I endorse the analyss of Arstotle’s argument here recently offered by Davd Sedley (2004), although I 
resst hs assumpton that Arstotle s here crtczng a poston he attrbuted to Democrtus.
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that he dd not dstngush between methods of dvson because hs arguments were 
ndependent of the method of dvson.
8. Aristotle’s Critique of Atomism
It s beyond the scope of ths artcle to gve a detaled account of Arstotle’s crtque of 
atomsm. My am s smply to argue that mplct n that crtque s an apprecaton of 
the dstncton between the two knds of atomsm, one nvolvng physcal atoms and 
the other nvolvng ndvsble magntudes.
In a number of places Arstotle construes Democrtean atomsm as a response 
to Parmendes and n those locatons t s clear that to play ther role n that con-
text those atoms must be changeless bodes wth a definte shape and sze.7 Arstotle 
clearly regarded ths theory of Leucppus and Democrtus to be by far the best of 
those of hs predecessors. It was “the most systematc and consstent theory” (Genera-
tion and Corruption, 324b:36) nvolvng a method that had confronted all the prob-
lems (315a:36–315b:1) defended by “arguments approprate to the subject” (316a:13). 
Arstotle’s problems wth the “solds” consttutng the atoms n ths physcal atomsm 
n effect nvolved the complant that because they were mpassve solds possessng 
only shape, sze and moton they were unable to nteract and combne n ways suf-
ficent to account for the range of actvty apparent n the world.8
Arstotle also argued aganst the knd of atomsm that nvokes ndvsble magn-
tudes. Insofar as the arguments for such enttes stem from a desre to resolve zeno’s 
paradoxes, Arstotle’s soluton of those paradoxes that dd not nvolve gvng up on 
contnuty obvated the motvaton for ntroducng ndvsble magntudes. Further, 
as we have seen, he saw problems wth the dea that ndvsble magntudes can be 
combned nto macroscopc enttes because, lackng edges, they cannot be lad edge 
to edge n the requred way. He solved the paradox of dvson by nsstng that a con-
tnuous body cannot be smultaneously dvded at an nfinty of ponts because ponts 
are not next to ponts n the requred way. 
The two knds of atomsm were combated wth dfferent knds of arguments. 
The dscusson of zeno’s paradoxes n the Physics makes no menton of Democr-
tus. Democrtus s mentoned n the context of the dscusson of nfinte dvson n 
Generation and Corruption. However, t s not clear that Arstotle s attrbutng the 
assumpton of ndvsble magntudes to Democrtus. I find t dfficult to reconcle 
the assumpton that he dd so wth the hgh regard Arstotle had for Democrtus’s 
theory as one that “confronted all the arguments” and wth “arguments approprate 
to the subject”. When, followng hs detaled dscusson of ndvsbles n Book 1, 
Chapter 2, he proceeds, n Book 1 Chapter 8, to dscuss atomsm nvolvng “ndvs-
ble solds”, and nssts that “we must not now enter upon a detaled study of the conse-
quences” (1, 8, 325b:35). But he has already gven a detaled dscusson of ndvsble 
7 See, for nstance, Generation and Corruption, (315a:35–315b:15 and 324a:24–325b:5).
8 The man arguments are set out n Generation and Corruption, 326a:1–326b:6.
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magntudes n Book 2. Ths, together wth hs explct referral n ths place to atoms as 
“solds”, ndcates a clear dstncton between physcal atoms and ndvsbles. Further, 
the arguments that Arstotle proceeds to offer aganst physcal atoms, summarzed by 
me n the second paragraph of ths secton, are qute dfferent n knd to those offered 
aganst ndvsble magntudes. 
9. Conclusion
I have argued that Arstotle dd apprecate the dstncton between physcal atoms 
and ndvsble magntudes and the dfferng senses n whch they are to be regarded 
as ndvsble. He argued aganst both knds of atomsm but wth qute dfferent knds 
of arguments. Ths s the case whether Arstotle regarded Democrtus as havng pro-
posed both knds of atomsm or not. I have suggested that the grounds for assum-
ng that Arstotle attrbuted an advocacy of ndvsble magntudes to Democrtus are 
weak.
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